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Abstract
The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies
by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a
characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of
the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly
infinite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenue equivalence
are immediate consequences.
1 Introduction
One of the most important results of auction theory is the Revenue Equivalence Theorem.
Subject to certain reasonable assumptions, it concludes that a variety of different auctions
generate the same expected revenue for the seller. Klemperer (1999) writes that “much
of auction theory can be understood in terms of this theorem.....”. Hence the long line
of papers that have attempted to relax the sufficient conditions under which revenue
equivalence holds. The present paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the
underlying primitives for revenue equivalence to hold.
We consider direct revelation mechanisms for agents with multidimensional types.
Such mechanisms consist of an allocation rule and a payment scheme. The allocation
rule selects an outcome depending on the agents’ reports about their type, whereas the
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payment scheme assigns a payment to every agent. We focus attention on allocation
rules that are implementable in dominant strategies. Hereafter we refer to such rules
as implementable. In this environment we characterize the uniqueness of the relevant
payment scheme in terms of conditions that are easily verified in potential applications.
The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique
payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. Our characterization of revenue equivalence
is based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints.
This graph theoretic interpretation has been used before to characterize allocation rules
that are implementable in dominant strategies (see Rochet 1987, Gui, Mu¨ller, and Vohra
2004 and Saks and Yu 2005). With this interpretation, our characterizing condition for
revenue equivalence almost suggests itself and the proof writes itself. The characterization
holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space. Many of the known results about revenue
equivalence are immediate consequences of our characterization.
Related Work. The bulk of prior work on revenue equivalence has been devoted to
identifying sufficient conditions on the type space for all allocation rules from a certain
class to satisfy revenue equivalence. The papers by Green and Laffont (1977) and Holm-
stro¨m (1979) restrict attention to allocation rules called ‘utilitarian maximizers’, that is,
allocation rules that maximize the sum of the valuations of all agents. Holmstro¨m, gen-
eralizing the paper by Green and Laffont, shows that when the type space is smoothly
path connected then utilitarian maximizers satisfy revenue equivalence.
Myerson (1981) shows that revenue equivalence holds for every implementable rule in
a setting where the type space is an interval of the real line, the outcome space is a lattice
and an agents valuation for an outcome is continuous and supermodular in her type.
Krishna and Maenner (2001) derive revenue equivalence under two different hypothe-
ses. In the first, agents’ type spaces must be convex and the valuation function of an
agent is a convex function of the type of the agent. Under these conditions they show
that every implementable rule satisfies revenue equivalence. The second hypothesis re-
quires the allocation rule to satisfy certain differentiability and continuity conditions and
the outcome space to be a subset of the Euclidean space. Furthermore, the valuation
functions must be regular Lipschitzian and monotonically increasing in all arguments.
Milgrom and Segal (2002) show that revenue equivalence is a consequence of a par-
ticular envelope theorem in a setting where the type spaces are one-dimensional and the
outcome space is arbitrary. An agent’s valuation function is assumed differentiable and
absolutely continuous in the type of the agent and the partial derivative of the valuation
function with respect to the type must satisfy a certain integrability condition. Their
2
result can be applied to multi-dimensional type spaces as well. In this case the type
spaces must be smoothly connected and the valuation functions must be differentiable
with bounded gradient.
We know of only two papers that identify necessary as well as sufficient conditions
for revenue equivalence to hold. If the outcome space is finite, Suijs (1996) character-
izes type spaces and valuation functions for which utilitarian maximizers satisfy revenue
equivalence. Chung and Olszewski (2007) characterize type spaces and valuation func-
tions for which every implementable allocation rule satisfies revenue equivalence, again
under the assumption of a finite outcome space. From their characterization, they derive
sufficient conditions on the type spaces and valuation functions that generalize known
results when the outcome space is countable or a probability distribution over a finite set
of outcomes. More precisely, they can show that some of the previously known conditions
can be weakened.
Our characterization result differs from prior work in an important way. We identify
a condition on the type spaces, the valuation functions and the implementable allocation
rule together that characterizes revenue equivalence. In other words, we prove that a
particular allocation rule satisfies revenue equivalence if and only if this condition is sat-
isfied. Our characterization result differs from the one by Chung and Olszewski (2007)
in three ways. First, ours holds for general outcome spaces. Second, our result implies
revenue equivalence in cases where their result does not apply. In fact, given agents’
type spaces and valuation functions, several allocation rules may be implementable in
dominant strategies, some of which satisfy revenue equivalence and some do not. In this
case, the conditions on the type space and valuation functions from their paper obviously
cannot hold. However, our characterization can be used to determine which of the alloca-
tion rules do satisfy revenue equivalence. We give a simple example in Section 7. Third,
the characterization in Chung and Olszewski (2007) is a corollary of our result, in the
sense that their necessary and sufficient condition is naturally related to our graph theo-
retic interpretation of revenue equivalence. We refer to Section 7 for details. Moreover,
our characterization yields elementary and direct alternative proofs for their sufficient
conditions for finite and countably infinite outcome spaces.
As in Chung and Olszewski (2007), such sufficient conditions yield a number of the
earlier results as immediate consequences We list some of them below. For details, we
refer to Section 7.
1. By restricting attention to countable outcome spaces we can relax in Holmstro¨m
(1979) the smooth connectedness condition on the type space to (topological) con-
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nectedness. In addition, our sufficient condition applies to any allocation that can
be implemented in dominant strategies rather than just utilitarian maximizers.
2. The sufficient condition that Suijs (1996) derives from his characterization follows
as a special case.
3. The sufficient condition of Krishna and Maenner (2001) under their first hypothesis
when the outcome space is countable follows as a special case.
4. The sufficient condition of Milgrom and Segal (2002) when the outcome space is
countable follows as a special case.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce notation
and basic definitions. In Section 3, we recall and prove some graph theoretic results.
These are applied in Section 4 to derive our main result, and in Sections 5 and 6 to
provide sufficient conditions for finite and countably infinite outcome spaces, respectively.
In Section 7 we show how the characterization from Chung and Olszewski (2007) can be
obtained as a consequence of ours and give an example to illustrate the differences between
our characterization and theirs. We conclude with extensions of our characterization result
to other notions of incentive compatibility in Section 8.
2 Setting and Basic Concepts
Denote by {1, . . . , n} the set of agents and let A be the set of possible outcomes. Outcome
space A is allowed to have infinitely many, even uncountably many, elements. By ti, we
denote the type of agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let Ti be the type space of agent i. Type spaces Ti
can be arbitrary sets. Agent i’s preferences over outcomes are modeled by the valuation
function vi : A×Ti → R, where vi(a, ti) is the valuation of agent i for outcome a when he
has type ti.
A mechanism (f, pi) consists of an allocation rule f : Πni=1Ti → A and a payment
scheme pi : Πni=1Ti → Rn. In a direct revelation mechanism, the allocation rule chooses for
a vector t of aggregate type reports of all agents an outcome f(t), whereas the payment
scheme assigns a payment pii(t) to each agent i. Let the vector (ti, t−i) denote the aggregate
type report vector when i reports ti and the other agents’ reports are represented by t−i.
We assume quasi-linear utilities, that is, the utility of agent i when the aggregate report
vector is (ti, t−i) is vi(f(ti, t−i), ti)− pii(ti, t−i).
In a truthful mechanism, truth telling is a (weakly) dominant strategy for every agent.
4
Definition 1 (dominant strategy incentive compatible) A direct revelation mech-
anism (f, pi) is called dominant strategy incentive compatible if for every agent i, every
type ti ∈ Ti, all aggregate type vectors t−i that the other agents could report and every
type si ∈ Ti that i could report instead of ti:
vi(f(ti, t−i), ti)− pii(ti, t−i) ≥ vi(f(si, t−i), ti)− pii(si, t−i).
If for allocation rule f there exists a payment scheme pi such that (f, pi) is a truthful
mechanism, then f is called implementable in dominant strategies, short implementable.
With the exception of Section 8, we assume that the allocation rule is implementable
in dominant strategies and we study the uniqueness of the corresponding payment scheme.
We refer to the latter as revenue equivalence.
Definition 2 (Revenue Equivalence) An allocation rule f that is implementable in
dominant strategies satisfies the revenue equivalence property if for any two dominant
strategy incentive compatible mechanisms (f, pi) and (f, pi′) and any agent i there exists a
function hi that only depends on the reported types of the other agents t−i such that
∀ti ∈ Ti : pii(ti, t−i) = pi′i(ti, t−i) + hi(t−i).
3 Unique Node Potentials in Directed Graphs
In this section, we prove two theorems about node potentials in directed graphs. The first
theorem yields a necessary and sufficient condition for a graph to have a node potential
that is uniquely defined up to a constant. The second theorem provides another sufficient
condition for uniqueness of the node potential up to a constant. In the following sections
we will make use of these results to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for revenue
equivalence to hold.
Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph with node set V and arc set E. V is allowed to be
infinite. By `ab we denote the (finite) length of the arc (a, b) from node a to node b. A path
from node a to node b in G, or short (a, b)-path, is defined as P = (a = a0, a1, . . . , ak = b)
such that (ai−1, ai) ∈ E for i = 1, . . . , k. Denote by length(P ) the length of this path. A
cycle is a path with a = b. For any a, we regard the path from a to a without any edges
as (a, a)-path as well and define its length as 0. We assume that G is strongly connected,
that is, between any two nodes a, b ∈ V , there exists an (a, b)-path and a (b, a)-path.
Define P(a, b) to be the set of all (a, b)-paths.
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Definition 3 (Node Potential) A node potential p is a function p : V → R such that
for all arcs (x, y) ∈ E, p(y) ≤ p(x) + `xy.
Lemma 1 A graph G has a node potential if and only if it has no cycle of negative length.
Proof. For finite node sets V , this result is well known. In graphs without negative
cycles it is possible to compute shortest paths from a fixed node a. The lengths distG(a, ·)
of these paths define a node potential. On the other hand, adding up the inequalities
p(y) − p(x) ≤ `xy for all edges (x, y) on a cycle proves that the cycle has nonnegative
length.
The proof for the finite case can be easily extended to the non-finite case, see for
example Rochet (1987) and Mu¨ller, Perea, and Wolf (2007). ¤
If G does not contain a negative cycle, we say that it satisfies the nonnegative cycle
property. In the following assume that G satisfies the nonnegative cycle property. Let
distG(a, b) = inf
P∈P(a,b)
length(P ).
If V is a finite set, then distG(a, b) simply equals the length of a shortest path from a to b
in G. For infinite V , such a shortest path may not exist. Nevertheless, distG(a, b) is finite,
since we assume that G does not have any negative cycle. In fact, fix some (b, a)-path Pba,
then length(P ) ≥ −length(Pba) holds for every (a, b)-path P and the infimum is finite.
The next theorem is concerned with the uniqueness of a node potential in a graph without
negative cycles.
Theorem 1 Let G = (V,E) be a strongly connected directed graph that satisfies the
nonnegative cycle property. Then the following statements are equivalent.
1. Any two node potentials in G differ only by a constant.
2. For all a, b ∈ V , distG(a, b) + distG(b, a) = 0.
Proof. [1 ⇒ 2] The function distG(a, ·) : V → R assigns to every node x ∈ V the
infimum over the lengths of all (a, x)-paths. Clearly, distG(a, x) ≤ distG(a, y) + `yx for
all (y, x) ∈ E and therefore distG(a, ·) is a node potential in G. Similarly, distG(b, ·)
is a node potential. As any two node potentials differ only by a constant, we have
that distG(a, ·) − distG(b, ·) is a constant function. Especially, for a and b we get that
distG(a, a) − distG(b, a) = distG(a, b) − distG(b, b). Clearly, distG(a, a) = distG(b, b) = 0
and hence distG(a, b) + distG(b, a) = 0.
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[2⇒ 1] Let a, b ∈ V . Let Pab be an (a, b)-path with nodes a = a0, a1, . . . , ak = b. For
any node potential p we have that
p(a1)− p(a) ≤ `aa1
p(a2)− p(a1) ≤ `a1a2
...
p(b)− p(ak−1) ≤ `ak−1b
and consequently p(b)− p(a) ≤ length(Pab). Therefore,
p(b)− p(a) ≤ inf
P∈P(a,b)
length(P ) = distG(a, b).
Similarly, p(a) − p(b) ≤ distG(b, a). Therefore, −distG(b, a) ≤ p(b) − p(a) ≤ distG(a, b).
Since distG(a, b) = −distG(b, a), p(b)−p(a) = distG(a, b) for any node potential p. Hence,
any potential is completely defined, once p(a) has been chosen for some outcome a. Thus,
any two node potentials can only differ by a constant. ¤
Next, we define a property of the graph G that is sufficient (though not necessary) for
uniqueness of node potentials up to a constant.
Definition 4 (Two-Cycle Connected) A graph with node set V and arc lengths ` is
called two-cycle connected if for every partition V1 ∪ V2 = V , V1 ∩ V2 = ∅, V1, V2 6= ∅,
there are a1 ∈ V1 and a2 ∈ V2 with `a1a2 + `a2a1 = 0.
Theorem 2 Let G be a directed graph that satisfies the nonnegative cycle property. If G
is two-cycle connected then its node potential is uniquely defined up to a constant.
Proof. First, we show that if G is two-cycle connected, then any two nodes a, b ∈ V are
connected inG by a finite path with nodes a = a0, a1, . . . , ak = b such that `aiai+1+`ai+1ai =
0 for i = 0, . . . , k−1. Call such a path a zero-path. Suppose to the contrary, that there is
a node a ∈ V that is not connected to all nodes in G by a zero-path. Define V1 to be the
set containing all nodes b that can be reached from a by a zero-path. Let V2 = V \V1. By
assumption V2 6= ∅. Then, as G is two-cycle connected, there is an a1 ∈ V1 and a2 ∈ V2
with `a1a2 + `a2a1 = 0 contradicting the assumption that a2 ∈ V2.
Consider a, b ∈ V and a zero-path Pab = (a0, a1, . . . , ak). Then Pab together with the
(b, a)-path Pba = (ak, . . . , a1, a0) form a cycle of length 0. Note, that between any two
nodes c, d on a cycle of length 0, the path from c to d on the cycle must be a shortest
path, as otherwise, we could construct a negative cycle by substituting this path by a
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shorter one. Therefore, distG(a, b) + distG(b, a) = length(Pab) + length(Pba) = 0. Hence,
any two node potentials in G differ only by a constant due to Theorem 1. ¤
To see that two-cycle connectedness is not necessary for the uniqueness of the node
potential, consider the following example.
Example 1 Consider graph G in Figure 1. The graph satisfies the nonnegative cycle
property, and for every two nodes u, v ∈ V , distG(u, v)+distG(v, u) = 0. Hence, the node
potential is uniquely defined up to a constant according to Theorem 1. Notice, however,
that G is not two-cycle connected, as the partition ({a, c}, {b}) violates the condition of
Definition 4.
a
c b
1
−2
3
−2
−1 3
Figure 1: Example
4 Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
We prove a necessary and sufficient condition for revenue equivalence with the aid of a
graph theoretic interpretation used by Rochet (1987), Gui et al. (2004) and Saks and
Yu (2005) to characterize implementable allocation rules. We also adopt some of their
notation.
Fix agent i and let the reports of the other agents t−i be fixed as well. For simplicity
of notation we write T and v instead of Ti and vi. Similarly, for any mechanism (f, pi),
we regard f and pi as functions of i’s type alone, i.e. f : T → A and pi : T → R. If (f, pi)
is dominant strategy incentive compatible, it is easy to see that for any pair of types
s, t ∈ T such that f(t) = f(s) = a for some a ∈ A, the payments must be equal, i.e.
pi(t) = pi(s) =: pia. Hence, the payment of agent i is completely defined if the numbers
pia are defined for all outcomes a ∈ A such that f−1(a) is nonempty. Therefore, we may
without loss of generality restrict attention to the case where f is onto. For an allocation
rule f , let us define the complete directed and possibly infinite allocation graph Gf with
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node set A3. Between any two nodes a, b ∈ A, there is a directed arc with length4
`ab = inf
t∈f−1(b)
(v(b, t)− v(a, t)).
As Gf is complete, it is also strongly connected.
Observation 1 Let f be an allocation rule. Payment schemes pi such that (f, pi) is a
dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism, correspond to node potentials in each
of the allocation graphs Gf that are obtained from a combination of an agent and a report
vector of the other agents.
Proof. Assume f is implementable. Fix agent i and the reports t−i of the other agents.
Regard the corresponding allocation graph Gf . As already mentioned above, for any pair
of types s, t ∈ T such that f(t) = f(s) = a for some a ∈ A, the payments must be equal,
i.e. pi(t) = pi(s) = pia. Therefore, pi is indeed a function assigning a real number to every
node in the graph. Incentive compatibility implies for any two outcomes a, b ∈ A and all
t ∈ f−1(b) that v(b, t)−pib ≥ v(a, t)−pia, hence, pib ≤ pia+ `ab. The latter is the definition
of a node potential in Gf .
For the other direction, define the payment pi for agent i as follows. For any report
vector of the other agents t−i, consider the corresponding allocation graph Gf . At ag-
gregate report vector (ti, t−i) with outcome a = f(ti, t−i), let the payment be equal to a
node potential pia in Gf . Incentive compatibility now follows from the fact that pi is a
node potential, similarly to the above. ¤
Clearly, the allocation graphs can be defined for any allocation rule such that all
arc lengths are finite. Observation 1 together with Theorem 1 therefore also yields a
characterization of allocation rules that are implementable in dominant strategies.
Observation 2 The allocation rule f is implementable in dominant strategies if and only
if all allocation graphs Gf obtained from a combination of an agent and a report vector
of the other agents satisfy the nonnegative cycle property.
From the observations above it follows that for any allocation rule f that is imple-
mentable in dominant strategies, there exist node potentials in all allocation graphs Gf .
3Clearly, the allocation graph depends on the agent i and reports t−i of the other agents. In order to
keep notation simple, we will suppress this dependence on i and t−i and will simply write Gf .
4We assume that arc length are strictly larger than −∞. For allocation rules implementable in
dominant strategies this is no restriction, as the incentive compatibility constraints imply finiteness of
the arc lengths.
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Furthermore, f satisfies revenue equivalence if and only if in all allocation graphs Gf the
node potential is uniquely defined up to a constant. Combining this with Theorem 1
yields our main theorem.
Theorem 3 (Characterization of Revenue Equivalence) Let f be an allocation rule
that is implementable in dominant strategies. Then f satisfies revenue equivalence if and
only if in all allocation graphs Gf obtained from a combination of an agent and a report
vector of the other agents, distGf (a, b) + distGf (b, a) = 0 for all a, b ∈ A.
To conclude this section, we give an illustrating example.
Example 2 Consider one agent with type space T = {x, y, z} and let the outcome space
be A = {a, b, c}. The valuations are given by the following table.
a b c
x 2 4 3
y 1 4 1
z 2 5 3
Consider allocation rule f with f(x) = a, f(y) = b, f(z) = c. Then the allocation
graph is the graph Gf pictured in Figure 1 of Section 3. The allocation rule f is im-
plementable in dominant strategies, as all cycles in the graph are non-negative. As Gf
satisfies the distance condition from Theorem 3, revenue equivalence holds.
5 Application to Finite Outcome Spaces
In this section, we prove revenue equivalence for finite outcome spaces when type spaces
and valuation functions satisfy very weak assumptions. From now on, we assume that
type spaces are subsets of a Euclidian space, i.e. Ti ⊆ Rki for every agent i. Recall that
a subset T of a topological space is connected if it cannot be covered non-trivially by the
disjoint union of two open sets. That is, there exist no open sets T1, T2 with T ⊆ T1 ∪ T2,
T1 ∩ T2 = ∅, T ∩ T1 6= ∅ and T ∩ T2 6= ∅. We prove the following.
Theorem 4 Let A be a finite outcome space. Let each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} have types
from the (topologically) connected type space Ti ⊆ Rki. Let each agent’s valuation function
vi(a, ·) be a continuous function in the type of the agent for every a ∈ A.
Then, every allocation rule f : Πni=1Ti → A that is implementable in dominant strategies
satisfies revenue equivalence.
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Independently Chung and Olszewski (2007) show how to derive Theorem 4 from their
characterization of revenue equivalence. We refer the reader to Section 7 for further
details. In order to prove Theorem 4, we need the following fact from topology that can
be found e.g. in Munkres (2000).
Fact 1 Let T ⊆ Rk be a connected set. Then any partition of T into subsets T1, T2 6= ∅,
T1 ∪ T2 = T , T1 ∩ T2 = ∅ satisfies T 1 ∩ T 2 6= ∅, where T i is the closure of Ti in T .
Now, we are able to prove the theorem.
Proof (Theorem 4). Consider a single agent with type space T and valuation function v.
Regard f as a function on T as before. Let A1 ∪ A2 = A, A1 ∩ A2 = ∅, A1, A2 6= ∅ be a
partition of A. Then, T = f−1(A1) ∪ f−1(A2), f−1(A1) ∩ f−1(A2) = ∅ is a partition of
T and f−1(A1), f−1(A2) 6= ∅, since f is onto. According to the fact above, there exists
t ∈ f−1(A1) ∩ f−1(A2). Hence, there are sequences (tn1 ) ⊆ f−1(A1) and (tn2 ) ⊆ f−1(A2)
with limn→∞ tn1 = limn→∞ t
n
2 = t. As A is finite, there must be a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2 and
subsequences (tnk1 ) ⊆ (tn1 ) and (tnm2 ) ⊆ (tn2 ) with f(tnk1 ) = a1 for all k and f(tnm2 ) = a2 for
all m. Since v is continuous in the type,
0 = v(a2, t)− v(a1, t) + v(a1, t)− v(a2, t)
= lim
n→∞
(v(a2, t
nm
2 )− v(a1, tnm2 ) + v(a1, tnk1 )− v(a2, tnk1 )).
According to the definition of the arc length in Gf , the latter can be bounded from below
as follows.
lim
n→∞
(v(a2, t
nm
2 )− v(a1, tnm2 ) + v(a1, tnk1 )− v(a2, tnk1 )) ≥ `a1a2 + `a2a1 ≥ 0.
The last inequality is true, since Gf has no negative cycles. Hence, all inequalities are
equalities and `a1a2 + `a2a1 = 0. Consequently, Gf is two-cycle connected. The claim
follows from Theorem 2 and Observation 1. ¤
Notice that we cannot omit the continuity assumption, as the following example
demonstrates.
Example 3 Let there be one agent with type t ∈ [0, 1] and two outcomes A = {a, b}. Let
the agent’s valuation be v(a, t) = 1, if t < 1/2 and v(a, t) = 0, if t ≥ 1/2. Let v(b, t) = 1/2
for all t. That is, v(a, ·) is discontinuous at t = 1/2. Let the allocation rule be the efficient
one, i.e., f(t) = a for t < 1/2 and f(t) = b otherwise. Then dominant strategy incentive
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compatibility is equivalent to 1 − pia ≥ 1/2 − pib and 1/2 − pib ≥ −pia, which is satisfied
whenever |pia−pib| ≤ 1/2. For instance, pia = pib = 0 or pi′a = 1/2, pi′b = 0 are two payment
schemes that make f truthful, but pi and pi′ do not differ by a constant.
If the type space is not connected, there are examples of the same flavor as Example 3,
where the payment scheme is not unique. However, even if the valuation function is not
continuous everywhere, sufficient conditions for revenue equivalence can be proven using
Theorem 2. Indeed, if the valuation functions are continuous at particular type vectors as
they are constructed in the proof, two-cycle connectedness of the graphs Gf follows. Also,
if T is path connected and between any two types there exists a continuous path such that
the valuation functions are continuous along this path, we can make use of Theorem 2.
6 Countably Infinite Outcome Spaces
Inspired by Chung and Olszewski (2007), we investigate the case of countably infinite
outcome spaces in this section. Again, the graph theoretic results from Section 3 yield an
elementary proof for revenue equivalence under weak assumptions, which we consider to
be simpler than the proof by Chung and Olszewski for the same result.
Let A be a countably infinite outcome set. For the moment, we identify the type
space of agent i with the set of infinite vectors that have a component for every outcome.
That is, Ti ⊆ RA and ta = vi(a, t). Our aim is to prove a result similar to Theorem 4.
We equip RA with a topology that is defined by means of ε-balls. Let Bε(t) = {s ∈
RA s.t. supa∈A |ta− sa| < ε} be the ε-ball around t in RA. Define an open set in RA as a
set S ⊆ RA such that t ∈ S implies that Bε(t) ⊆ S for some ε > 0. It is straightforward
to check that this indeed defines a topology on RA. We prove the following theorem that
can also be found in Chung and Olszewski (2007).
Theorem 5 Let A be a countable outcome space. Let the type space Ti ⊆ RA for every
agent i be (topologically) connected with respect to the above defined topology.
Then, every allocation rule f : Πni=1Ti → A that is implementable in dominant strategies
satisfies revenue equivalence.
Note that Theorem 5 generalizes Theorem 4. While the proof of Theorem 4 follows
easily from Theorem 2, this approach fails in the infinite case, and in fact, our proof of
Theorem 5 is based on Theorem 1 rather than 2. That is why we gave the case of finite
A an independent treatment in the previous section.
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Proof (Theorem 5). Let f be an allocation rule implementable in dominant strategies
which does not satisfy revenue equivalence. According to Theorem 3, there is an agent i
and a report vector of the other agents t−i with corresponding allocation graph Gf and
a∗, b∗ ∈ A such that distGf (a∗, b∗) + distGf (b∗, a∗) > 0. Let T be the type space of i
and regard f as a function on T as before. As A is countable, the set {distGf (a∗, x) +
distGf (x, a
∗) |x ∈ A} contains only countably many values5. Hence, there exists a δ > 0
such that the sets A1 = {x | distGf (a∗, x)+distGf (x, a∗) < δ} and A2 = {x | distGf (a∗, x)+
distGf (x, a
∗) > δ} are both non-empty and together yield a partition of A. Then, the sets
T1 = f
−1(A1) and T2 = f−1(A2) are non-empty and yield a partition of the type space T .
T1 is a proper subset of T . We will show that T1 is open and closed, implying that T is
not connected.
T1 is open: Let t ∈ T1. Let f(t) = x ∈ A1. Then, distGf (a∗, x) + distGf (x, a∗) = δ − ε
for some ε = ε(x) > 0. Let s ∈ Bε/2(t) and y = f(s). Then the following is true:
distGf (a
∗, y) + distGf (y, a
∗) ≤ distGf (a∗, x) + `xy + `yx + distGf (x, a∗)
≤ distGf (a∗, x) + distGf (x, a∗) + sy − sx + tx − ty
≤ distGf (a∗, x) + distGf (x, a∗) + |sy − ty|+ |tx − sx|
< δ − ε+ ε
2
+
ε
2
= δ
Hence distGf (a
∗, y)+distGf (y, a
∗) < δ. Thus y ∈ A1 and s ∈ T1. Consequently, Bε/2(t) ⊆
T1 and T1 is open.
T1 is closed: Let (t
n)n∈N be a sequence in T1 that converges to t ∈ T with respect
to the above defined topology. Suppose for contradiction that t ∈ T2. Let x = f(t).
Then distGf (a
∗, x) + distGf (x, a
∗) = δ + εx for some ε = ε(x) > 0. Choose n0 such that
supa∈A |tn0a − ta| < ε/2. Let y = f(tn0). As tn0 ∈ T1, distGf (a∗, y) + distGf (y, a∗) < δ.
5We were inspired by Chung and Olszewski (2007) to use countability this way.
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Then the following holds:
δ + ε = distGf (a
∗, x) + distGf (x, a
∗)
≤ distGf (a∗, y) + `yx + `xy + distGf (y, a∗)
< δ + `yx + `xy
≤ δ + tx − ty + tn0y − tn0x
≤ δ + |tx − tn0x |+ |ty − tn0y |
< δ +
ε
2
+
ε
2
= δ + ε,
a contradiction. ¤
Now we abandon the identification of type spaces with vectors in RA and return to
the explicit use of valuation functions. We obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Let A be a countable outcome space. Let each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} have
types from the (topologically) connected type space Ti ⊆ Rki. Let each agent’s valuation
function vi : Ti → RA be a continuous function with respect to the above defined topology
on RA.
Then, every allocation rule f : Πni=1Ti → A that is implementable in dominant strategies
satisfies revenue equivalence.
Proof. As the vi are continuous and the Ti are connected, vi(Ti) is connected for every
agent. The result follows immediately from Theorem 5. ¤
Notice that continuity of vi : Ti → RA with respect to the above defined topology is a
different notion than continuity of vi(a, ·) for every a ∈ A. Especially, the latter does not
imply the former.
An example in Holmstro¨m (1979) demonstrates that Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 cannot
be generalized to the case of an uncountable outcome space. In that example, there is one
agent with a one-dimensional type from a compact interval on the real line and continuous
valuation function. The outcome space is a compact interval as well and Holstro¨m shows
that revenue equivalence fails.
7 Deducing Existing Results
In this section, we show how the characterization of Chung and Olszewski (2007) follows
from our main result and comment briefly on the results in other papers on revenue
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equivalence. First, we introduce the notation used by Chung and Olszewski and restate
their characterization theorem.
Let A be finite. Let B1, B2 be disjoint subsets of A and r : B1 ∪ B2 → R. For every
ε > 0, let
V1(ε) = ∪b∈B1{t ∈ T | ∀ a ∈ B2 : v(b, t)− v(a, t) > r(b)− r(a) + ε}
and
V2(ε) = ∪a∈B2{t ∈ T | ∀ b ∈ B1 : v(b, t)− v(a, t) < r(b)− r(a)− ε}.
Finally, Vi = ∪ε>0Vi(ε). Observe that V1∩V2 = ∅. Call the type space T splittable if there
are B1, B2 and r such that T is a subset of V1 ∪ V2 where Vi 6= ∅ for i = 1, 2.
Theorem 6 (Chung and Olszewski 2007) Let A be finite. Then, the following two
statements are equivalent.
1. All f that are implementable in dominant strategies satisfy revenue equivalence.
2. T is not splittable.
Notice that in Theorem 3 no assumption on the cardinality of A is made, whereas in
Theorem 6, A is assumed finite. On the other hand, Theorem 3 imposes a condition on
the allocation rule, whereas Theorem 6 characterizes T and v such that all allocation rules
that are implementable in dominant strategies satisfy revenue equivalence. When A is
not finite but countable it is shown by Chung and Olszewski that item 2 of Theorem 6
implies revenue equivalence.
In order to show that Statement 2 in Theorem 6 is a necessary condition for revenue
equivalence, one can directly construct an allocation rule and two payment schemes that
do not differ by a constant from the assumption that T is splittable. This is done in the
paper by Chung and Olszewski. We give an alternative proof for the fact that Statement 2
is a sufficient condition. Our proof establishes the connection to the allocation graph
defined in Section 4 and assigns an interpretation to the function r defined above.
Proof. [2 ⇒ 1] Let f be an allocation rule that is implementable in dominant strategies
but does not satisfy revenue equivalence. Since f is implementable in dominant strategies,
the allocation graph Gf satisfies the non-negative cycle property. Using Theorem 3, there
are a, b ∈ A such that distGf (a, b) + distGf (b, a) > 0. We show that this implies that T is
splittable. That is, there exist B1, B2, and r : B1 ∪ B2 → R such that there is an ε > 0
such that V1(ε), V2(ε) 6= ∅ and T ⊆ V1(ε) ∪ V2(ε).
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Let
B1 = {c ∈ A | distGf (a, c) = −distGf (c, a)} and
B2 = {c ∈ A | distGf (a, c) > −distGf (c, a)}.
Clearly, (B1, B2) is a partition of A and both sets are non-empty. From the definition of
B2 we get for every b1 ∈ B1, b2 ∈ B2 that
distGf (a, b2) + `b2b1 + distGf (b1, a) > 0,
since otherwise a and b2 would lie on the same 0-length cycle implying distGf (a, b2) +
distGf (b2, a) = 0. As b1 ∈ B1, this is equivalent to
`b2b1 > distGf (a, b1)− distGf (a, b2).
As B1 and B2 are finite, there exists δ > 0 such that for all b1 ∈ B1, b2 ∈ B2
`b2b1 > distGf (a, b1)− distGf (a, b2) + δ. (1)
Let us define the function r by
r(c) =
{
distGf (a, c) + δ, if c ∈ B1;
distGf (a, c), if c ∈ B2.
Then we get from (1):
`b2b1 > r(b1)− r(b2). (2)
Similarly, from the definition of the dist-function, we get for all b1 ∈ B1, b2 ∈ B2
distGf (a, b1) + `b1b2 ≥ distGf (a, b2),
and consequently
`b1b2 > r(b2)− r(b1). (3)
Due to the finiteness of B1 and B2 there exists an ε > 0 such that for all b1 ∈ B1, b2 ∈ B2,
`b2b1 > r(b1)− r(b2) + ε , and (4)
`b1b2 > r(b2)− r(b1) + ε. (5)
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Observing that for t ∈ f−1(b1), v(b1, t) − v(b2, t) ≥ `b2b1 and for t ∈ f−1(b2), v(b2, t) −
v(b1, t) ≥ `b1b2 , inequalities (4) and (5) imply that f−1(B1) ⊆ V1(ε) and f−1(B2) ⊆ V2(ε).
Hence, T ⊆ V1(ε) ∪ V2(ε). Finally, V1(ε) and V2(ε) are non-empty, as B1 and B2 are
non-empty, thus T is splittable. ¤
To illustrate the difference between our characterization and that by Chung and
Olszewski, we give an example where their characterization cannot be applied, but where
Theorem 3 implies revenue equivalence.
Example 4 Reconsider Example 2 from Section 4, where Theorem 3 implied revenue
equivalence. If the characterization by Chung and Olszewski applied as well, then all allo-
cation rules implementable in dominant strategies would have to satisfy revenue equiv-
alence for the given type space and valuation functions. To see that this is not the
case, consider allocation rule g such that g(x) = c and g(y) = g(z) = b. The al-
location graph has nodes b and c and arc lengths `bc = v(x, c) − v(x, b) = −1 and
`cb = inf{v(y, b) − v(y, c) , v(z, b) − v(z, c)} = 2, which gives a cycle of strictly posi-
tive length. Therefore, g is implementable in dominant strategies, but does not satisfy
revenue equivalence according to Theorem 3.
Using Theorem 6, Chung and Olszewski derive sufficient conditions for revenue equiv-
alence for the case of countable outcome spaces and for outcome spaces that are the set
of all probability distributions over a finite set. For countable outcome spaces, their re-
sults coincide with our Theorem 4 and Corollary 1. The results of prior work mentioned
in the introduction (Green and Laffont 1977, Holmstro¨m 1979, Krishna and Maenner
2001, Milgrom and Segal 2002) follow in the same way from Theorem 4 and Corollary 1
as described by Chung and Olszewski. We therefore refer to their paper for a detailed
discussion of the mentioned literature. Furthermore, the sufficient condition that Suijs
(1996) derives from his characterization follows easily from our results and the fact that
path-connectedness implies connectedness.
8 Other Notions of Incentive Compatibility
Our results can be extended to other notions of incentive compatibility. We briefly discuss
two of them.
Ex-post incentive compatibility with externalities. The notation used throughout
this paper can be used to model allocational externalities, as allocations to all agents can
be described by an outcome a ∈ A. In order to account for informational externalities
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in the case of ex-post incentive compatibility, the valuation function of agent i is also
a function of the true types of the other agents. An ex-post equilibrium is a Nash-
equilibrium where every agent knows the types of all other agents. Formally, truth-telling
is an ex-post equilibrium for allocation rule f and payment scheme pi if for all agents i,
all types ti and si of i and all types t−i of the other agents
vi(f(ti, t−i), ti, t−i)− pi(ti, t−i) ≥ vi(f(si, t−i), ti, t−i)− pi(si, t−i).
Again, incentive compatible payment schemes can be associated with node potentials
in the allocation graphs the edge lengths in Gf have to be defined as follows:
`ab = inf
ti∈f−1(b)
(vi(b, ti, t−i)− vi(a, ti, t−i)).
We get the following result.
Theorem 7 An ex-post implementable allocation rule f satisfies revenue equivalence if
and only if in every allocation graph Gf , for every two allocations a, b, distGf (a, b) +
distGf (b, a) = 0.
Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. Mu¨ller, Perea, and Wolf (2007) show how to
construct a graph similar to the allocation graph for the case of Bayes-Nash incentive
compatibile allocation rules. In this setting, the (multi-dimensional) types of all agents
are independently distributed random vectors. The notation used by Mu¨ller, Perea, and
Wolf accounts for allocational as well as informational externalities, that is, the valuation
of an agent depends on the chosen allocation, the type of the agent and the types of all
other agents. An allocation rule f is said to be Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if there
is a payment scheme pi such that for all agents i and all types ti and si of i the following
is true
E−i[vi(f(ti, t−i), ti, t−i)− pii(ti, t−i)] ≥ E−i[vi(f(si, t−i), ti, t−i)− pii(si, t−i)],
where the expected value is taken with respect to the types of all agents other than i.
That is, truth-telling of every agent is a Nash equilibrium when agents try to maximize
expected utilities. For every agent i, one can construct a single complete directed graph,
the type graph T if , where there is a node for each type of the agent and the length of the
edge from type si to type ti is defined as follows:
`siti = E−i[vi(f(ti, t−i), ti, t−i)− vi(f(si, t−i), ti, t−i)].
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Incentive compatible payment schemes can then be associated with node potentials in the
type graph.
Theorem 8 A Bayes-Nash implementable allocation rule f satisfies revenue equivalence
if and only if in the type graph T if of f with respect to any agent i, for all types si and ti
of this agent, distTf (si, ti) + distTf (ti, si) = 0.
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